UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

TEAJAY BOLES,)	
Petitioner,)	
)	
V.)	CV423-300
STATE OF GEORGIA,)	
Respondent.)	

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pro se petitioner TeaJay Boles has filed the instant petition for release from state custody, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See generally doc. 1. He moves to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 3. Since it appears that he lacks sufficient funds to pay the filing fee, that Motion is **GRANTED**. Doc. 3. The Court, therefore, proceeds to screen the Petition. See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases ("If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition"). 1

¹ The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases also govern petitions pursuant to § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

Boles' Petition states that he is a pretrial detainee incarcerated at Chatham County Detention Center. See doc. 1 at 1. He asserts four grounds for relief: (1) that the amount of his bond is unconstitutionally high, (2) that he has not been indicted, despite being incarcerated for six months, (3) that he "was persued [sic] by the Port Wentworth Police [D]epartment behind a non forceable felony," and (4) that the warrant for his arrest was defective. Id. at 7-8. He is explicit that none of his grounds has been presented to any state authority or tribunal. See id. at 3, 6, 7-8. He requests that he "would like to rec[ei]ve an O.R. Bond" Id. at 8. Although it is unclear, at best, whether release on bond is available relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Boles' explicit failure to exhaust any of his claims is fatal regardless.

As a pretrial detainee, a § 2241 petition is the proper means for Boles to seek release from custody. *See, e.g., Hiteshaw v. Butterfield*, 262 F. App'x 162, 164 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[A] pre-trial detainee . . . is not in custody pursuant to any state court judgment, and his habeas petition should . . . [be] treated as a § 2241 petition."). The Eleventh Circuit has explained, however, that "a district court may not grant a § 2241 petition unless the petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies."

Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court explained that exhaustion has two essential elements: (1) "a federal claim must be fairly presented to the state courts," and (2) "a prisoner must take his claim to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review." Id. at 1096 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Boles' Petition is explicit that he has not presented his complaints in any state proceeding. See doc. 1 at 3, 6, 7-8. Under Georgia law, "[a]ny person restrained of his liberty under any pretext whatsoever, except under sentence of a state court of record, may seek a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the restraint." O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1(a). Boles must exhaust all available remedies provided under state law before he can seek relief in this Court. Cf. Daker v. Sapp, 2019 WL 3713713, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2019) ("Federal habeas corpus should not be used as a pretrial motion forum for state prisoners." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

This Court should also abstain from hearing this case pursuant to the Supreme Court's opinion in *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). *See Johnson*, 32 F.4th at 1099 (explaining that an unexhausted § 2241

petition "is barred for another independent reason: the application of the abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris...."). The Eleventh Circuit has recently denied a Certificate of Appealability in a state pre-trial detainee's habeas proceeding, concluding that "reasonable jurists would not debate" that dismissal of a § 2241 petition was proper, pursuant to Younger. See Lewis v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff Office, 2021 WL 5217718, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2021). The Court explained that "when a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief prior to a pending state criminal trial the petitioner must satisfy the Younger abstention hurdles before the federal courts can grant such relief." Id. (quoting Hughes v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)).

"The Supreme Court set out three exceptions to the [Younger] abstention doctrine: (1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith; (2) irreparable injury would occur; or (3) there is no adequate, alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised." Lewis, 2021 WL 5217718, at * 1 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 53-54). The court concluded: "Application of the Younger abstention doctrine is, therefore, appropriate when the federal constitutional claims at issue can be raised in an ongoing state court proceeding and the

individual seeking relief has not established that he lacks an adequate opportunity to present those claims in the state proceeding." *Id.* (citing *Younger*, 401 U.S. at 49). Nothing in Boles' Petition suggests that any of the *Younger* exceptions apply.

The face of Boles' Petition shows, therefore, that his claims are unexhausted and that they appear to be barred by *Younger* abstention. Accordingly, the petition should be **DISMISSED**. This Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party may file written objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations." Any request for additional time to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the assigned district judge.

After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The district judge will review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of

rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonette v. V.A. Leasing Corp.,

648 F. App'x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 F.

App'x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).

Applying the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standards, which

are set forth in Brown v. United States, 2009 WL 307872 at * 1-2 (S.D.

Ga. Feb. 9, 2009), the Court discerns no COA-worthy issues at this stage

of the litigation, so no COA should issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see

Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) (approving sua

sponte denial of COA before movant filed a notice of appeal). And, as

there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, an appeal would not

be taken in good faith. Thus, in forma pauperis status on appeal should

likewise be **DENIED**. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

SO ORDERED AND REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this

14th day of November, 2023.

CHRISTOPHER L. RAY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

6